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EVEN MOE DALITZ WOULD BLUSH:
WHY THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY HAS NO
BUSINESS COLLECTING UNPAID
CASINO MARKERS
Francis J. Mootz III*
Gambling has a long and circuitous history in American law.1 Perhaps the
strangest turn in this journey is the current situation in Nevada, in which the
District Attorney uses the force of criminal law to collect unpaid loans owed to
casinos in return for a generous ten percent bounty.2 It is part of the lore of Las
Vegas that the mob running some of the casinos in the city would send a bag-
man to collect unpaid debts, with a variety of unpleasant consequences for
those who refused to pay. Morris Barney “Moe” Dalitz reputedly was the last
of the great mobsters to control gambling in Las Vegas, and common wisdom
held that it was most certainly not a good thing to be indebted to Moe. At the
same time, the lore holds that he had the reputation for being a reasonable man:
you were in real trouble only if you had the ability to pay and were attempting
to skirt your obligations. In addition to this reputation for displaying a measure
of reasonableness, he was a major benefactor of many charities and cultural
sites in Las Vegas, with the result that he was given the honorific title, “Mr. Las
Vegas.”3 Thus, it is not too far a stretch to suggest that even Moe Dalitz would
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1 For a brief history of gambling and gambling regulation with citations to the literature, see
Ronald J. Rychlak, The Introduction of Casino Gambling: Public Policy and the Law, 64
MISS. L.J. 291, 294-305 (1995).
2 2  The District Attorney is authorized to conduct debt collection programs for dishonored
checks by NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.466 (2009). The Bad Check Diversion Unit may seek
restitution in lieu of criminal prosecution, and is empowered to collect an administrative fee
on a sliding scale that rises to 10% of the face value of a check in excess of $10,000. See id.
§ 205.471.
3 A brief biography of Moe Dalitz is provided at Moe Dalitz, WIKIPEDIA, http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moe_Dalitz (last visited Jan. 8, 2012); see also Chapter 6: Moe Dal-
itz, Racket Boss Reborn, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Aug. 25, 2005, http://www.reviewjournal.com/
lvrj_home/2005/Aug-28-Sun-2005/news/26985900.html; and John L. Smith, The Double
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blush if he could see the current collection operation run by the District Attor-
ney of Clark County.
A customer wishing to secure credit from a casino to continue gambling
after exhausting cash on hand can enter a credit agreement with the casino that
permits the customer to sign a “marker” at the table in exchange for an advance
of chips. Under existing Nevada case law, “markers” are treated as “checks.”4
Consequently, unpaid markers may be presented to the District Attorney for
prosecution under the “bad check” criminal statute.5 Treating each marker as a
separate check, and therefore as the basis of a separate criminal offense, can
present the customer with a terrifying threat of many years of incarceration.6
This situation evokes a troubling image. Casinos have no need for a bagman if
they can refer the debt to the public prosecutor to collect under threat of a
criminal trial leading to imprisonment. The seemingly distant memory of debt-
ors’ prisons suddenly returns as an all-too-vivid reality.7
This Article, will first describe the basis upon which the District Attorney
acts as a collection agent for casinos and then demonstrate that this basis is
wholly without support under the law of negotiable instruments. To render the
discussion concrete, this Article refers to the recent high-profile case in which
Terrance Watanabe was prosecuted by the Clark County District Attorney for
refusing to pay $14.75 million in casino markers, a refusal that was motivated
by his ongoing legal dispute with the casinos that held the markers.8 This Arti-
cle concludes that the strong intuition that there is something fundamentally
wrong with the State of Nevada using its police power to collect unpaid loans
owed to casinos, and accepting a substantial fee for doing so, turns out to be
wholly in accord with the applicable law as properly understood.
Life of Moe Dalitz, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., available at http://www.1st100.com/part2/dal-
itz.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2012).
4 Nguyen v. State, 14 P.3d 515, 518 (Nev. 2000).
5 NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.130 (2009).
6 Under NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.130(1)(e), passing a bad check in excess of $250 is a cate-
gory D felony. The punishment for a category D felony is a prison term not less than one
year and not more than four years in duration, and the court may impose a fine of not more
than $5,000. Id. § 193.130(d). In addition, the court must award restitution. Id. Under the
indictment of Mr. Watanabe, described below, he was subject to as many as twenty-eight
years in prison for refusing to pay on markers because of Harrah’s Entertainment’s alleged
breaches of the parties’ agreement.
7 As one critic recently summarized, the combination of practices under bad check laws
cause them “to violate one of the settled constitutional traditions of our law: No imprison-
ment for debt.” Elwood Earl Sanders, Jr., Time to Close the Collection Agency: Addressing
the Abuse of Bad Check Laws, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 215, 237 (2007).
8 I must disclose that I was retained as an expert witness by Mr. Watanabe’s legal counsel
and was disclosed as such to the court shortly before the criminal charges were dropped in
June 2010. In the course of my review of the facts of the case, I became convinced that the
use of the “bad check” statute as a basis for the criminal prosecution of persons who fail to
pay their casino markers is inherently flawed, in addition to having been improperly applied
to Mr. Watanabe. This article is a direct outgrowth of my services as an expert retained to
testify at trial. It is important to emphasize that I was retained as an independent expert and
not as a consultant working for Mr. Watanabe, and that the criminal prosecution has now
been dismissed with prejudice. Publishing this article raises no pecuniary conflict of interest
for me, and my arguments and conclusions represent my best judgment and are not shaped in
any manner by any ongoing work as a consultant or expert.
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I. SETTING THE STAGE: CUSTOMARY PRACTICES REGARDING CASINO
MARKERS AND THE WATANABE INDICTMENT
Markers are a “crucial tool” for a modern casino competing for high stakes
gamblers.9 Extending credit “has become vital in facilitating and furthering the
goals of companies conducting business in the industry.”10 Typically, a casino
will reach a credit agreement with a customer after ensuring that the customer
has sufficient funds to cover the credit line and anticipated debt.11 A blank
marker is produced at the table and signed by the customer.12 The parties often
negotiate a disposition date, which specifies how long the casino will hold the
marker before submitting it for payment. Delayed presentation permits the cus-
tomer to seek to “win back” any losses or otherwise arrange his or her financial
affairs to pay the debt, without the marker ever being presented to his or her
bank.13 If a customer fails to redeem the marker within the designated time, the
casino may enter the customer’s bank information on the marker and process it
as a check. If the marker is returned by the customer’s bank, the casino may
then submit it to the Bad Check Unit of the District Attorney’s office.
Mr. Watanabe’s experience illustrates how very wealthy customers may
amass substantial credit debt in the form of markers that translates to the threat
of substantial prison time, even if there are very serious questions about the
propriety of the debt owed. The following account is drawn from Mr.
Watanabe’s civil suit against Harrah’s, which makes allegations that have never
been proven in a court of law. The point of relating his allegations is to demon-
strate how criminalizing casino debt by mischaracterizing markers as checks
can overshadow serious questions that implicate public policy and the regula-
tion of gambling in the state.
Terrance Watanabe’s story begins with his rapid separation from the bulk
of his inherited assets over a period of several years spent living and gambling
in Las Vegas.14 Watanabe was living and gambling primarily at the Wynn
resort until Steve Wynn reportedly asked him to leave because of his obvious
9 ANTHONY N. CABOT & JOSEPH M. KELLY, CASINO CREDIT & COLLECTION 1 (2003). A
review of the practices in Nevada is provided in Robert D. Faiss, Nevada Industry Credit
Practices and Procedures, 3 GAMING L. REV. 145 (1999).
10 Darren A. Prum, Enforcement of Gaming Debt, 7 GAMING L. REV. 17, 17 (2003); see
also, E. MALCOLM GREENLEES, CASINO ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 298
(2d ed. 2008) (“The availability of casino credit is a crucial element of a casino’s marketing
and operating strategy.”). Greenlees notes that 15-19% of total wagers might be credit, lead-
ing him to conclude that extending credit is “essential.” Id. at 298-99.
11 See CABOT & KELLY, supra note 9, at 21-26; see also GREENLEES, supra note 10, at 301-
12.
12 GREENLEES, supra note 10, at 308.
13 CABOT & KELLY, supra note 9, at 11.
14 The following account is drawn from the factual allegations in a civil complaint filed by
Mr. Watanabe. Complaint at 2-6, Terry K. Watanabe v. Harrah’s Entm’t, Inc., No. A-09-
603929-B XXV (Nev. Clark Cnty. Dist. Ct. Nov. 19, 2009) (WizNet) (copy on file with the
author). The complaint was withdrawn with prejudice and the claims were resolved by arbi-
tration subject to a confidentiality agreement. It bears emphasis that for my purpose whether
the facts alleged are true is not important, as I am discussing only how these alleged facts
should have been analyzed under the law without the warping effect of a criminal prosecu-
tion in the background.
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alcoholism, gambling addiction, and erratic behavior. In November 2006, Har-
rah’s Entertainment Corporation15 enticed Watanabe to gamble at their resorts
by agreeing to provide additional compensation and benefits to him, including a
promise to hold his markers for a longer disposition date before presenting
them for payment. As early as April 2007, however, Harrah’s began defaulting
on its obligations under the agreement in various ways. Watanabe moved to
Harrah’s properties in June 2007, ultimately residing at Caesars Palace. For the
next six months, Watanabe was gambling out of control, and he was severely
intoxicated with liquor and painkillers that were provided by Harrah’s agents.16
In response to this alarming behavior, Harrah’s decided to increase his credit
limit and table limits, despite having reason to know of his rapidly deteriorating
health and financial condition. During 2007, Watanabe wagered a staggering $1
billion at Harrah’s properties for a net loss of $127 million.
In January 2008, while Watanabe was out of the country, Harrah’s unilat-
erally chose to enter one of Watanabe’s bank accounts on a number of markers
and then presented them for payment prior to the agreed disposition date.
Watanabe then alleged that Harrah’s was failing to comply with their agree-
ment and claimed that he was owed substantial sums of money. Harrah’s
presented the final $14.75 million in markers, but Watanabe’s bank did not
honor them. In May 2008, Harrah’s presented thirty-eight markers to the Dis-
trict Attorney for investigation by the Bad Check Unit, but did not disclose the
disposition date for the markers or the ongoing dispute it was having with
Watanabe regarding the accounting of his comps and benefits.
Watanabe was indicted for writing bad checks and threatened with a maxi-
mum of twenty-eight years in prison. The indictment charged Watanabe with
one count of theft and one count of passing bad checks at the Rio Las Vegas
Hotel & Casino and the same two counts with regard to his conduct at Caesars
Palace Casino (both casinos were part of the Harrah’s corporate family). The
indictment specified that Watanabe “willfully, unlawfully and with intent to
defraud” issued a total of thirty-eight “checks to obtain cash and/or gaming
15 Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc. changed its official company name to Caesars Entertainment
Corporation in November 2010.
16 Mr. Watanabe’s lead attorney, Pierce O’Donnell, provided more graphic descriptions in
his letter to the Nevada Gaming Control Board, as related in an article published in the Las
Vegas Sun:
Watanabe’s lawyer provided regulators with the names of nearly a dozen witnesses who he says
could substantiate Watanabe’s accusations that Harrah’s officials unlawfully preyed on his gam-
bling addiction and supplied him nonstop with alcohol and prescription painkillers as he racked
up $112 million in gambling losses in 2007 . . . .
O’Donnell likened Harrah’s treatment of Watanabe over the next six months to “drug dealers
feeding a heroin addict’s deadly habit” and said it “warrants the most severe sanctions.”
Casino security officers kept watch over Watanabe during this time under orders from the “high-
est management levels”–not to protect him but to help casino officials control his movements to
keep him gambling, O’Donnell wrote.
He said Watanabe was “reduced to a robot-like existence” at Caesars Palace, where he stayed for
months during his epic gambling binge.
Jeff German, Regulators Holding Off to Let Court Rule in Watanabe Case, LAS VEGAS SUN,
Nov. 20, 2009, http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2009/nov/20/regulators-holding-let-cour-
trule-watanabe-case.
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chips . . . when the Defendant had insufficient money, property or credit with
the drawee of the instrument to pay it in full upon its presentation.”17
The indictment immediately had a profound effect on how Mr.
Watanabe’s allegations were handled. His lawyer filed a detailed complaint
with the Nevada Gaming Control Board in light of the serious allegations of
misconduct in violation of important gaming regulations,18 but the Nevada
Gaming Control Board refused to act on the complaint in light of the pending
criminal case against Mr. Watanabe.19 If the markers were properly treated as
credit instruments, the civil dispute between Mr. Watanabe and Harrah’s would
not have interfered with the investigation by regulatory authorities of the very
serious allegations made by Mr. Watanabe regarding the failure of Harrah’s to
fulfill its obligations as a licensed casino. Although the criminal complaint
against Mr. Watanabe was dropped more than one year ago, the Gaming Con-
trol Board has yet to commence an investigation. The global settlement reached
by Mr. Watanabe and Harrah’s in the shadow of the criminal indictment has
apparently served to effectively preclude a public investigation.20
The indictment of Mr. Watanabe was premised on a decision by the
Supreme Court of Nevada that the failure to pay a casino marker falls within
the purview of the bad check statute. In Nguyen v. State,21 the court held that
Mr. Nguyen was properly prosecuted when he was charged with four counts
alleging the drawing and passing of a check with insufficient funds. The court
acknowledged that the casinos held the markers for a period of time before
submitting them to the bank on which they were drawn, quoting the testimony
at trial that Harrah’s permitted customers to replace the marker with a personal
17 Indictment at 2-3, State v. Terrance K. Watanabe, No. C254057 (Nev. Clark Cnty. Dist.
Ct. Apr. 29, 2009) WizNet) (copy on file with the author).
18 For example, the following regulation provides for disciplinary action if the Watanabe
allegations were to be substantiated.
5.011 Grounds for disciplinary action. The board and the commission deem any activity on the
part of any licensee, his agents or employees, that is inimical to the public health, safety, morals,
good order and general welfare of the people of the State of Nevada, or that would reflect or tend
to reflect discredit upon the State of Nevada or the gaming industry, to be an unsuitable method
of operation and shall be grounds for disciplinary action by the board and the commission in
accordance with the Nevada Gaming Control Act and the regulations of the board and the com-
mission. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the following acts or omissions may be
determined to be unsuitable methods of operation:
1) Failure to exercise discretion and sound judgment to prevent incidents which might
reflect on the repute of the State of Nevada and act as a detriment to the development of the
industry.
2) Permitting persons who are visibly intoxicated to participate in gaming activity.
3) Complimentary service of intoxicating beverages in the casino area to persons who are
visibly intoxicated.
Nev. Gaming Comm’n Reg. 5.011 (2011).
19 See German, supra note 16. As the newspaper account summarized, “Regulators don’t
want to interfere with the criminal case, which is being prosecuted by the district attorney’s
office, so they have stayed on the sidelines while it plays out.”
20 Jennifer Gross, Reference Librarian at the Weiner-Rogers Law Library at UNLV con-
tacted the Gaming Control Board multiple times to inquire about the status of this matter, but
her inquiries received no response. Documentation of these efforts during September 2011 is
on file with the author.
21 14 P.3d 515 (Nev. 2000).
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check within thirty days. However, the court ultimately concluded that the
“practice of allowing a customer to pay gaming debts with a second check is a
matter of courtesy and convenience to the customer.”22 The court concluded
that the markers met the definition of a “check” for the purpose of the bad
check statute because they “stated no time or date of payment” on their face
and therefore were payable on demand.23 In response to Mr. Nguyen’s argu-
ment that the markers were credit instruments because Harrah’s agreed to hold
them for thirty days before presenting them for payment, the court held that
whether “an obligee chooses to cash a check immediately or at a later date does
not alter the character of the instrument. Further, there is no evidence that
Nguyen and the casinos understood the marker to effect a contract for a
loan.”24
The reasoning in Nguyen is unpersuasive on its face. Mr. Nguyen’s law-
yers may have failed to present his case with strong evidentiary support, but the
statement by the Harrah’s employee regarding the thirty-day disposition date
certainly was sufficient under the law to raise a question of whether the marker
was payable on demand or whether the parties had agreed otherwise. As dis-
cussed below, the Nguyen court made serious mistakes of law that have fore-
closed parties from challenging the dogma that casino markers are properly
regarded as checks for the purpose of the bad check statute. The status of
casino markers under the Uniform Commercial Code—as properly understood
and applied—is analyzed by using the allegations made by Mr. Watanabe to
provide a rich, factual context.
II. CASINO MARKERS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO THE BAD CHECK STATUTE
Casino markers should not be treated as “checks” for the purpose of the
bad check statute if there is an agreement with the customer that the marker
will not be presented immediately. This part first discusses the evolution and
current provisions of the bad check statute. Next, it demonstrates that an agree-
ment by a casino to hold a marker for a period of time before presentation is
enforceable and renders the marker a credit instrument rather than a check.
Such an agreement would not fall within the scope of the parol evidence rule,
nor would it satisfy the parol evidence rule, and so the agreement could be
enforced despite not being referenced in the written marker. Finally, it is argued
that a party cannot “agree” that a credit instrument is a “check” subject to the
criminal provisions of the bad check law when the credit instrument does not
meet the legal definition of a check.
A. The Bad Check Statute
The development of the modern banking system in the twentieth century
facilitated the use of checks as a form of immediate payment, subject only to
the time necessary for the check to clear through banking channels. As noted in
a contemporary law review article, in that “era of expanding credit and the
22 Nguyen v. State, 14 P.3d 515, 517 n.1 (Nev. 2000).
23 Id. at 518.
24 Id.
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widespread use of checks as a substitute for currency,” states found it necessary
to adopt bad check laws to protect the integrity of the checking system as a
form of immediate payment, drawing an analogy to the common law crime of
obtaining property by false pretenses.25 This policy justification is evidenced
by the fact that checks are by definition payable on demand and that post-dated
checks generally fall outside the scope of bad check statutes.26 “A situation
analogous to the post-dated check situation is where the payee agrees to with-
hold presentment for a given period. This, like the post-dated check, is a credit-
type arrangement.”27 Thus, it is generally a valid defense to argue that the par-
ties treated the instrument like a promissory note rather than a check.28
The bad check statute in Nevada makes it illegal for a person “willfully,
with an intent to defraud” to draw “a check or draft to obtain . . . credit
extended by any licensed gaming establishment . . . when the person has insuf-
ficient money . . . with the drawee of the instrument to pay it in full upon its
presentation.”29 Simply put, the elements of the crime created by the statute
require a “check” that is issued by the drafter for the purpose of obtaining
casino credit. It is clear that casino patrons obtain credit in exchange for signing
casino markers, and so the discrete question presented is whether casino mark-
ers are properly considered “checks” for the purpose of the criminal statute.30
25 Legislation: Bad Check Laws, 44 HARV. L. REV. 451, 451-53 (1931). As noted in a more
recent article, the fact that many criminal statutes apply to a check written for an antecedent
debt establishes that the crime is regarded as one against the checking payment system as an
immediate payment mechanism rather than on the fraud perpetrated against the recipient of
the check. James E. Crowe, Jr., Comment, Insufficient Funds Checks in the Criminal Area:
Elements, Issues, and Proposals, 38 MO. L. REV. 432, 433 (1973).
26 Legislation: Bad Check Laws, supra note 25, at 454-55 (noting that Kentucky’s attempt
to bring postdated checks within its bad check statute was later struck down on constitutional
grounds). One author explains the distinction between checks and postdated checks for pur-
poses of a bad check criminal statute:
Theoretically, the scienter essential to a violation of the statue is absent with regard to a post-
dated check. The inference from post-dating is that while the defendant may know that there are
insufficient funds at issuance, he expects that on the written date there will be sufficient funds.
The defendant’s culpable intent is further absolved through the recipient’s compliance in taking a
post-dated check, since the understanding is that present payment of the check is impossible.
Thus, this transaction takes on the appearance of a credit arrangement, and failure of sufficient
funds at the later date may well be for reasons beyond the maker’s control and intent at the date
of issuance. Following this rationale, some statutes expressly exclude post-dated checks.
Crowe, supra note 25, at 446.
27 Id. at 447. The student author recognizes that an “argument against the credit rationale” is
the legislative intent to “curb the flow of worthless commercial paper in the business world,
and that an insufficient, post-dated check is still worthless,” id., but surely this argument is
without merit. Promissory notes are enforceable negotiable instruments that play a large role
in the economy, but no state has attempted to criminalize the failure to pay a promissory note
when it comes due. The fact of the matter is that states have used the requirement of a
“check” to reach only instruments that are payable on demand and to exclude credit instru-
ments. An instrument that is not payable on demand is a credit instrument.
28 Id. at 449 (citing Gibbs v. Commonwealth, 273 S.W.2d 583, 584-85 (Ky. 1954) and
Jackson v. State, 70 So. 2d 438, 439 (Miss. 1965)).
29 NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.130(1)(e) (2009).
30 Id. On its face, the statute is incoherent because it defines “credit” in a manner that
clearly makes no sense if applied to the phrase “casino credit.” The statute reads: “For the
purposes of this section, “credit” means an arrangement or understanding with a . . . corpora-
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It is interesting to note that the Nevada bad check statute originally applied
both to promissory notes and to checks. The statute provided that it was a mis-
demeanor to “make, pass, utter or publish any bill, note, check or other instru-
ment,” until the statute was changed in 1979 by adopting the current language
making it illegal for a person to draw or pass a “check or draft.”31 Sixteen years
later, the legislature increased the crime to a felony, with the maximum penalty
of four years in prison and a $5,000 fine.32 Presumably, the limitation of the
scope of the statute to checks—a form of immediate payment—supported the
decision to increase the criminal penalties.
There is a strong argument that the legislature has erred in its judgment
that state resources and the threat of criminal sanctions should be used to col-
lect unpaid checks.33 In a recent article, one commentator argues that the inap-
propriate use of criminal process to collect dishonored checks has a pernicious
effect on the poor and amounts to the threat of imprisonment for debt that has
widespread and longstanding collateral effects on those who are subject to the
prosecutor’s decision to indict.34 For the purpose of this article, of course, it is
necessary to accept the legislature’s policy determination that the bad check
statute reflects a sound public policy. However, the public policy advanced by
the statute should guide its application; under the maxim of lenity, there should
be a strong presumption against reading this criminal statute more broadly than
necessary to accomplish its manifest purpose.35 Viewed in this light, casino
markers do not fall within the scope of the bad check statute.
Application of the bad check statute to debts memorialized by casino
markers has occurred only recently. Originally, gambling debts were unen-
forceable in Nevada as a matter of common law.36 Twenty-five years ago, the
Nevada legislature determined that casino markers should be enforceable by
tion for the payment of a check or other instrument.” Id. § 205.130(4). This ambiguity is
clarified when one understands that the legislature intended the definition of credit to apply
to various overdraft features that a drawer might have in place to ensure the payment of a
check. In other words, the effect of the mention of credit later in the provision is to “save”
the drawer from liability even if the drawer did not have cash available on deposit at the time
the markers were presented for payment. If the drawer had a credit arrangement in place with
the bank to cover overdrafts, then the drawer cannot be in violation of the statute simply by
making a decision not to pay the check for the reason that the drawer has a defense to the
payment obligation. This ambiguity exists in other state statutes. See Crowe, supra note 25,
at 442.
31 S.B. 174, 1979 Leg., 60th Sess. (Nev. 1979) effected this change in the law.
32 NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.130 (2009), incorporating NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.130.
33 See SANFORD H. KADISH, BLAME AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 29-30
(MacMillan Publishing Co. 1987); see also Crowe, supra note 25, at 458 (“There is consid-
erable controversy on the question whether the writing of an insufficient funds check should
even be a criminal offense. Those in favor of the criminal sanction point to the deterrent
effect of a criminal statute and the need for the protection of the negotiability of checks;
those opposed argue that an adequate civil remedy exists, that the prosecutor has become a
debt-collecting agent, and that merchants are careless in accepting checks because there is a
criminal sanction.”).
34 See generally Sanders, supra note 7, at 215.
35 The Nevada Supreme Court recently affirmed the importance of the rule of lenity in State
v. Lucero, 249, P.3d 1226, 1230-31 (Nev. 2011).
36 Scott v. Courtney, 7 Nev. 419, 420-21 (1872).
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legal process.37 With gambling debts enforceable, casinos began seeking col-
lection of unpaid markers under the bad check law. This in turn presents a
seemingly simple question: is a casino marker a check?
The Uniform Commercial Code defines the term “check,” but it is impor-
tant at the outset not to conflate the definitions of “check” and “negotiable
instrument.” Not all negotiable instruments are checks. For example, a promis-
sory note can be a negotiable instrument, but it is not a “check.” Therefore, the
fact that a casino marker may be a negotiable instrument is irrelevant to deter-
mining whether that casino marker is a “check” that might trigger criminal
liability under the bad check law. Generally, negotiable instruments fall into
two categories: they are either a note (a promise by the maker to pay at some
point in the future; it can also be payable on demand) or a draft (an order to
another party to pay the payee on behalf of the drawer).38 A check is a type of
draft39 that is drawn on a bank and payable on demand.40 An item is “payable
on demand” if it “does not state any time of payment.”41 Conversely, an item is
“payable at a definite time” if it “is payable on elapse of a definite period of
time after sight or acceptance . . . .”42
Markers do not contain a date and information regarding the bank, and so,
at the time of signing, they clearly cannot be considered a check. In effect, the
casino attempts to convert the marker to a check at some point after its execu-
tion. As explained by industry representatives, if, “after completing play, the
patron does not redeem his outstanding credit instrument, the casino may com-
plete the instrument to meet the requirements of a check or can treat the instru-
ment as a promissory note.”43 At the time of execution, then, the marker is
clearly not a check. The argument in this Article is simple: a casino cannot
convert the credit instrument to a check if the parties have agreed that the
marker is not payable on demand.
These fundamental principles of payment systems law under the Uniform
Commercial Code establish a simple and clear basis for concluding that casino
markers (as commonly utilized in the industry) are not checks. To illustrate this
conclusion, we return to the allegations made in the complaint filed by
Watanabe against Harrah’s. Mr. Watanabe alleged that he had been provided
with repayment terms for the markers that had permitted him to pay the
amounts at a later point in time. Because the casino markers expressly were not
payable on demand, but rather were payable sixty days from their execution,
they were not checks and could not be properly converted to checks, and there-
37 NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.368(1) (2009) permits licensed gaming establishments to collect
gaming debts, which are not specifically defined and therefore presumably include promis-
sory notes, drafts, checks and other instruments.
38 U.C.C. § 3-104(e)-(f) (2005); NEV. REV. STAT. § 104.3104(5)-(6)(a) (2009).
39 Another common instance of a draft is a documentary draft commonly used in interna-
tional transactions. See U.C.C. § 4-104(6) (2002); NEV. REV. STAT. § 104.4104(f) (2009).
U.C.C. § 3-104 cmt. 4 notes that another example of a non-check draft is a draft drawn on an
insurance company but payable through a bank.
40 U.C.C. § 3-104(f) (2005); NEV. REV. STAT. § 104.3104(6)(a) (2009).
41 U.C.C. § 3-108(a) (2005); NEV. REV. STAT. § 104.3108(1)(c) (2009).
42 U.C.C. § 3-108(b) (2005); NEV. REV. STAT. § 104.3108(2) (2009).
43 CABOT & KELLY, supra note 9, at 29.
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fore could not serve as the basis for an indictment under Nevada’s bad check
law even if the markers could properly be deemed negotiable instruments.44
B. An Agreement to Hold Markers for a Specified Time Is Enforceable,
and Thus Markers Are Not Payable on Demand and Do Not Meet the
Definition of a Check
The following sections demonstrate that a casino marker that qualifies as a
negotiable instrument but not as a check is subject to ordinary contract
defenses. A negotiable instrument is immune from such defenses only when it
is enforced by a holder in due course, and the payee-casino is not a holder in
due course of a casino marker. This section further explains why the parol
evidence rule does not impede the proof of such defenses and agreements relat-
ing to the disposition date of a casino marker.
1. Markers Held by Casinos Are Subject to Ordinary Contract
Defenses
Negotiable instruments were developed by trading merchants at a time
when there were no national currencies as we understand them today.45
Merchants utilized a private body of law and conflict resolution—lex Mer-
catoria or “the Law Merchant”—and also developed procedures for making
the transportation of funds easier and safer. Merchants regarded a writing that
had no promises on its face other than an order to a responsible third party46 to
make a payment of a sum certain upon presentation as a critical feature of
commercial practice. The merchants exchanged this commercial paper by nego-
tiating it to another merchant, with the result that it might change hands numer-
ous times before being presented and paid. Because the holder of the draft often
would be far removed from the initial transaction that led to the issuance of the
draft, the Law Merchant began to develop rudimentary principles that the
holder of what we now term a “negotiable” draft who acquired it in good faith
and in exchange for value given may enforce the obligation on the face of the
draft free of any claims or defenses that a prior owner of the draft might have.47
Lord Mansfield famously incorporated these principles into the English com-
mon law in a series of cases that serve as the foundation of the modern law of
negotiable instruments.48
44 The credit nature of markers is underscored by a leading text, which defines “marker” in
a glossary as “A document, usually signed by the customer, evidencing an extension of
credit to him or her by the casino. A casino receivable.” GREENLEES, supra note 10, at 480.
45 For more detail on the history related in this paragraph, see generally WILLIAM H. LAW-
RENCE, UNDERSTANDING NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS AND PAYMENT SYSTEMS 5-7 (2002).
46 Id. At this time, the third party usually was a gold merchant. These merchants filled an
important commercial role before the development of the banking industry in England.
47 See JAMES STEVENS ROGERS, THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES
(1995) (recognizing the genitive principles of the law merchant in this area, but emphasizing
the common law development of the modern law of negotiable instruments).
48 The principal cases are Miller v. Race, (1758) 97 Eng. Rep. 398, 1 Burr. 452 (K.B.) and
Peacock v. Rhodes, (1781) 99 Eng. Rep. 402, 2 Doug. 633 (K.B.). The common law princi-
ples were then codified in The English Bills of Exchange Act of 1882, 45 & 46 Vict. C. 61,
§§ 29, 38.
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A holder in due course of a negotiable instrument is immune from ordi-
nary contract defenses on the instrument, but it is critical to understand that not
all “holders” qualify as a “holder in due course.” A casino is a “holder” of
casino markers executed by its customers, and these markers very well may be
negotiable instruments, but the casino is not a “holder in due course” of the
markers because it is the original payee on them.49 As a result, a casino is
subject to any defenses that its customer may raise in connection with issuance
of a marker by the customer. Although it is a common mistake to think of
negotiable instruments in terms of the ease with which they are enforceable by
a holder in due course, the situation is different in the case of casino markers
held by the original payee. This fundamental rule is set forth in U.C.C. § 3-305,
which provides in part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the right to enforce the obligation of
a party to pay an instrument is subject to the following:
. . .
(2) a defense of the obligor stated in another section of this Article or a defense
of the obligor that would be available if the person entitled to enforce the instru-
ment were enforcing a right to payment under a simple contract;
. . .
(b) The right of a holder in due course to enforce the obligation of a party to pay the
instrument is . . . not subject to defenses of the obligor stated in subsection (a)(2).50
As explained in Official Comment 2:
If Buyer issues an instrument to Seller and Buyer has a defense against Seller, that
defense can obviously be asserted. Buyer and Seller are the only people involved.
The holder-in-due-course doctrine has no relevance. The doctrine applies only to
cases in which more than two parties are involved. Its essence is that the holder in
due course does not have to suffer the consequences of a defense of the obligor on
the instrument that arose from an occurrence with a third party.51
49 MGM Desert Inn, Inc. v. William Shack, 609 F. Supp. 783, 785 (D. Nev. 1993)
(Although a credit instrument [marker] is a negotiable instrument, the casino is a holder and
not a holder in due course, and so remains subject to contract defenses to enforcement raised
by the maker). In contrast, in TeleRecovery of La., Inc. v. Gaulon, 98-1363 (La. App. 5 Cir.
6/1/99); 738 So. 2d 662, the Court noted that the negotiable marker had been assigned to the
plaintiff by the issuing casino. Although the court did not expressly determine that the plain-
tiff was a holder in due course, this would shape the later analysis of the enforceability of the
marker. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently provided a correct analysis of
holder in due course status in connection with a civil action to enforce a marker. In Las
Vegas Sands, LLC v. Nehme, 632 F.3d 526, 535 (9th  Cir. 2011) the court was constrained to
accept the Nevada Supreme Court’s incorrect conclusion in Nguyen that casino markers are
checks. However, the court’s failure in Nguyen to analyze the question of defenses to pay-
ment on the check provided the Court of Appeals with the freedom to properly conclude that
a casino receiving a marker is not a “holder in due course” that can avoid ordinary contract
defenses.
At the outset, the Venetian is not a “holder in due course,” i.e., “one who takes the instrument (1)
for value, (2) in good faith and (3) without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of
any defenses or claims to it.” . . . The Venetian had dealt with Nehme, and was a party to both
the credit application and the marker. . . . Nevada law makes the Venetian “subject to all
defenses of [Nehme,] a party with whom the holder has dealt.”
Id. at 535-36.
50 U.C.C. § 3-305(a)(2)-(b) (2002); NEV. REV. STAT. § 104.3305 (2009).
51 U.C.C. § 3-305, cmt. 2 (2002).
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This fundamental principle is reinforced by the provisions of U.C.C. § 3-117:
Subject to [the parol evidence rule], the obligation of a party to an instrument to pay
the instrument may be modified, supplemented, or nullified by a separate agreement
of the obligor and a person entitled to enforce the instrument, if the instrument is
issued or the obligation is incurred in reliance on the agreement or as part of the same
transaction giving rise to the agreement. To the extent that an obligation is modified,
supplemented, or nullified by an agreement under this section, the agreement is a
defense to the obligation.52
Official Comment 1 explains:
For example, a person may be induced to sign an instrument under an agreement that
the signer will not be liable on the instrument unless certain conditions are met . . . .
Section 3-117, in treating the agreement as a defense, allows [the promissor] to assert
the agreement against Creditor, but the defense would not be good against a subse-
quent holder in due course of the note that took it without notice of the agreement.53
Official Comment 2 makes clear that the general parol evidence rule under state
law governs whether the promissor can prove the prior or contemporaneous
agreement.54
These densely-worded commercial law principles may be illustrated by
applying them to the Watanabe matter. The agreement between the parties that
the markers would be held for sixty days is an agreement that is enforceable by
Mr. Watanabe against Harrah’s even though the markers might be regarded as
payable on demand if they met the definition of a negotiable instrument and a
holder in due course sought to enforce them. In re Armstrong (Harrah’s v.
Meeks)55 provides careful and accurate analysis of the effect of a side agree-
ment to hold a casino marker for payment. Armstrong considered whether the
casino markers were a loan transaction or constituted payment by check for
casino chips. This characterization was important because a loan transaction
would be subject to bankruptcy prohibitions on preferential transfers. The court
concluded that the markers, even if they are considered checks, were subject to
a credit agreement and therefore did not constitute a contemporaneous payment
for value received. The court explained:
The record clearly shows that Harrah’s agreed to hold the markers initially for four-
teen days, and then thirty days, before submitting them to Armstrong’s bank for
payment. When Harrah’s extended a line of credit to Armstrong, permitted him to
sign markers in exchange for chips, and promised not to present the markers to his
bank for payment for a definite length of time, Harrah’s made a short term loan to
Armstrong.56
The court emphasized that casino markers do not satisfy the underlying
policy of Section 547(c) of the Bankruptcy Code to permit the debtor to con-
tinue operating by paying contemporaneously for value received. “Harrah’s has
not convinced us that these policy concerns will be met by encouraging casinos
to issue credit to troubled debtors so they may, with the odds against them,
gamble away their remaining assets and increase their debt. A far better policy
52 U.C.C. § 3-117 (2004); NEV. REV. STAT. § 104.3117 (2009).
53 U.C.C. § 3-117 cmt. 1 (2004).
54 Id. § 3-117 cmt. 2.
55 291 F.3d 517 (8th Cir. 2002).
56 Id. at 523.
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would be to discourage casinos from issuing credit to insolvent individuals like
Armstrong.”57
The Armstrong court drew an analogy between markers and payday loans,
a transaction in which a business accepts a post-dated check in exchange for an
immediate payment. As is generally the case with markers, the entire purpose
of a “payday loan” transaction is that the item is not properly deposited
immediately.
It is noteworthy that Harrah’s policy requires the immediate deposit of personal
checks written or paychecks signed over to the casino for chips; whereas, the casino
will hold for later presentment the markers it issues as a part of the “Casino Credit”
arrangement . . . . An analogy between the markers issued by Harrah’s and short term
“payday loans” is enlightening as to why the markers here form part of a loan trans-
action . . . . The payday lender typically holds the borrower’s postdated check until
“payday,” when it is either redeemed by the borrower with cash or presented to the
borrower’s bank for payment. Similarly, in the marker context, the casino agrees to
hold the gambler’s signed marker for a specified period of time, here thirty days,
before presenting it to the borrower’s bank . . . . Armstrong’s debt to Harrah’s here
was incurred on October 12 and 13, 1995. The payment on the debt was not due until
the agreed upon time when the marker could be deposited at the bank, thirty days
later. Because the debt here was incurred thirty days before payment, we find the
payment of the casino markers constituted the payment of antecedent debt for pur-
poses of 11 USC [§] 547(b).58
The court’s analogy to the receipt of postdated checks in exchange for
payday loans not only clarifies the applicable legal analysis, it refers to a
regime where the applicable public policy concerns are likely to be similar to
casino markers.59
2. The Parol Evidence Rule Does Not Bar Introduction of Evidence of
the Agreement to Delay Presentment of the Markers
This section demonstrates that the parol evidence rule should not bar evi-
dence of a delayed disposition date for the marker. First, a delayed disposition
date might be part of the “agreement” of the parties as broadly defined by the
57 Id. at 525.
58 Id. at 524 (internal citations omitted).
59 Cases dealing with payday loans provide a basis for analogizing to situations such as the
Watanabe matter. See, e.g., Hodge v. The Money Shop (In re Hodge), 367 B.R. 843 (Bankr.
M.D. Ala. 2007), which involved a payday loan company that called the debtor after receiv-
ing notice of a stay related to a Chapter 13 filing to threaten her with criminal prosecution
for writing a bad check. The bankruptcy court determined that punitive damages against the
creditor were appropriate because the threatening call was not only willful but also mali-
cious, since the threat to have the debtor arrested and criminally prosecuted was wrongful
and against right. Id. at 847-49. As noted, the underlying transaction here was a so-called
payday loan. See Deferred Presentment Services Act, Ala. Code  § 5-18A-1 et. seq. (2003).
“Under Alabama law, the maker of a check which is given pursuant to this statute and which
is dishonored upon presentment because of insufficient funds cannot be criminally prose-
cuted under the State’s worthless check statute.” In re Hodge, 367 B.R. at 848 (citing Ala.
Code § 5-18A-13(h)). The statute, as is typical in many states, precludes the use of criminal
enforcement for payday loan checks, and so the court was not required to analyze the bad
check statute. ALA. CODE § 5-18A-13(h). One important implication of these kinds of cases,
and the statutory regime, is that states find it contrary to public policy to use criminal sanc-
tions to secure the repayment of checks used as credit instruments.
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UCC and therefore not subject to the parol evidence rule. Second, even if the
marker constitutes a partial integration of the agreement of the parties, evidence
that the undated marker was to be held for a period of time before presentment
does not contradict the written marker. In this situation, the evidence would be
admitted notwithstanding the parol evidence rule.
a. Parties May Prove the Elements of “Agreement” under the
UCC Without Triggering the Parol Evidence Rule
The parol evidence rule in Article 2 of the UCC would not apply to con-
tracts involving markers because those agreements are not a transaction in
goods.60 However, courts may properly draw an analogy to the parol evidence
rule of the Uniform Commercial Code (§ 2-202) in cases involving markers
because it is premised on the definition of “agreement” in Article 1, which does
govern the law of negotiable instruments. The majority of courts have (prop-
erly) interpreted the somewhat opaque language of UCC § 2-202 to mean that
evidence of course of performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade is
always admissible and never will be barred by the parol evidence rule.61 This
stems from the definition of “agreement” as “the bargain of the parties in fact,”
rather than a technical notion that the agreement is just the formal written
expression adopted by the parties.62 Thus, the agreement of the parties is to be
“found in their language or inferred from other circumstances, including course
of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade as provided in Section 1-
303.”63 These elements of the agreement are not subject to the parol evidence
rule because they are not “prior agreements” of the parties; instead, together
they constitute the agreement in question.
Parties, and sometimes even courts, mistake the alleged “hierarchy” of
UCC § 1-303 as working like the parol evidence rule, but the majority rule
clearly rejects this interpretive mistake as creating a “false parol evidence
rule.”64 When there is evidence of the agreement that goes beyond language,
the law makes clear that the judge shall not preference the terms expressed in
language in the first instance. Instead, the UCC provides that “the express terms
of an agreement and applicable course of performance, course of dealing,
[and/] or usage of trade must be construed wherever reasonable as consistent
with each other,” and that a preference for terms in writing is permissible only
if a consistent construction of all forms of evidence “is unreasonable.”65 In
other words, the court is mandated to read all the elements of agreement
together if there are reasonable means to do so, even if such a reading is not the
60 UCC § 2-102 provides that Article 2 of the UCC “applies to transactions in goods.”
“Goods” are defined as things that “are movable at the time of identification to the contract
for sale other than . . . things in action.” UCC § 2-105(1) (2004). Although a marker may be
memorialized on paper, it is a contract right to recover payment for the extension of credit
and therefore is not a “good.”
61 The leading case in this regard is Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d
772, 794-805 (9th Cir. 1981).
62 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 216 cmt. b. (1981).
63 U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(3) (2004); NEV. REV. STAT. § 104.1201(2)(c) (2009).
64 Roger W. Kirst, Usage of Trade and Course of Dealing: Subversion of the UCC Theory,
1997 U. ILL. L. F. 811, 869.
65 U.C.C. § 1-303(e) (2004); NEV. REV. STAT. § 104.1303(5) (2009).
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most reasonable understanding of the evidence.66 For example, the course of
performance by Harrah’s to hold Mr. Watanabe’s markers for sixty days, the
course of dealing of holding his markers prior to the credit agreement in ques-
tion, and the usage of trade in the casino industry generally to hold markers for
payment and not treat them as payable on demand must all be read together
with the terms of the marker to determine the actual agreement (bargain in fact)
of the parties, so long as there are reasonable means of doing so. It is eminently
reasonable to find that the markers were indeed credit instruments that were not
payable on demand in light of this other evidence, evidence of the “agreement”
that is not subject to the parol evidence rule.
This point is fundamental to the law of the UCC, but often missed by
courts that are applying general contract law principles. The Nguyen court was
simply wrong in its analysis when it concluded that “the practice of delaying
payment of a marker” is insufficient to render “the instrument a loan docu-
ment.”67 If the evidence provided by Mr. Nguyen met the definition of usage of
trade, it was evidence of the agreement of the parties that can undermine the
66 A commercial agreement, then, is broader than the written paper and its meaning is to be
determined not just by the language used by them in the written contract but “by their action,
read and interpreted in the light of commercial practices and other surrounding circum-
stances. The measure and background for interpretation are set by the commercial context,
which may explain and supplement even the language of a formal or final writing.” U.C.C.
§ 1-303 cmt. 1. “Performance, usages, and prior dealings are important enough to be admit-
ted always, even for a final and complete agreement; only if they cannot be reasonably
reconciled with the express terms of the contract are they not binding on the parties.”
Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co., 664 F.2d at 795. The court surveyed numerous courts that
“have interpreted their own state’s versions of the Code in line with the weight of federal
authority on the U.C.C. to admit freely evidence of additional terms, usages, and prior deal-
ings and harmonize them in most instances with apparently contradictory express terms.” Id.
at 799. This approach is embraced as part of general contract law. “Wherever reasonable, the
manifestations of intention of the parties to a promise or agreement are interpreted as consis-
tent with each other and with any relevant course of performance, course of dealing, or usage
of trade.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(5). The Restatement embraces the
contextual approach to interpreting a written agreement:
When the parties have adopted a writing as a final expression of their agreement, interpretation is
directed to the meaning of that writing in the light of the circumstances . . . . The circumstances
for this purpose include the entire situation, as it appeared to the parties, and in appropriate cases
may include facts known to one party of which the other had reason to know.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202, cmt. b. (internal citations omitted). Nevada
has embraced this interpretive rule. See Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Butch Lewis Prod., Inc., 808
P.2d 919, 921-22 (Nev. 1991) (quoting Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co., 664 F.2d at 780)
(“Although some courts still follow traditional bargain theory and refuse to delve beyond the
express terms of a written contract, the better approach is for the courts to examine the
circumstances surrounding the parties’ agreement in order to determine the true mutual
intentions of the parties. Courts today tend to be willing to look beyond the written document
to find the ‘true understanding of the parties.’”). For a detailed explanation and defense of
the interpretive approach first embodied in the UCC and now more generally embraced in
contract law, see Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and Supple-
mentation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1710 (1997).
67 The relevant language from the opinion is as follows:
According to Nguyen, the practice of delaying payment of a marker renders the instrument a loan
document, whereby the signer agrees to pay the debt before an agreed-upon but unwritten dispo-
sition date. We disagree. Whether an obligee chooses to cash a check immediately or at a later
date does not alter the character of the instrument . . . .
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presumption that the markers are payable on demand. If the disposition date of
the marker is established through evidence of course of performance, course of
dealing, and trade usage, introduction of this evidence does not implicate the
parol evidence rule.
b. Parties may prove prior and contemporaneous oral agreements
that do not contradict a partially integrated writing
In most cases, a casino and its customer reach an express agreement about
the disposition date of markers prior to their issuance. Casinos might argue that
the existence of a written marker precludes a customer from proving a prior
express agreement regarding payment of the marker. As detailed in the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts, the modern application of the parol evidence rule
should have no such effect. First, the trial judge must hear all proffered parol
evidence to determine if the writing was intended by the parties to be an inte-
gration of their agreement.68 If the marker is deemed to be a “complete integra-
tion” of all the terms of the deal between the parties, then even evidence of a
consistent additional term regarding the timing of payment would be barred.69
A writing is completely integrated if the parties intended it to be a complete and
exclusive statement of the terms of their agreement. Courts determine whether
the writing was completely integrated by looking to the intent of the parties. In
the Restatement formulation, a writing is not completely integrated if the prof-
fered prior agreement is consistent with the writing and is “such a term as in the
circumstances might naturally be omitted from the writing.”70
It is highly unlikely that a court would find that a casino marker was
intended by the parties to be a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of
their arrangements, given that the marker is a form document with substantial
details missing at the time of execution by the customer. Additionally, there is
no merger clause, or other warning that the hastily signed marker overrides all
pre-existing agreements between the casino and the customer. The fact that
essential terms of the writing, such as the bank on which the marker is drawn,
are not included at the time of execution and must be completed at a later date
plainly establishes that the writing is only partially integrated.71 The Comments
to the Restatement explain the relevant factors of the “naturally omitted” test.
Nguyen also argues that the agreement by the gaming establishments to hold the markers for a
period of time rendered them the ‘equivalent’ of post-dated checks. However, just as there is no
evidence here that the parties intended the markers to represent a loan instrument, there is no
evidence that the parties mutually understood that the markers were post-dated checks. The face
of the documents demonstrates that they were payable on demand, at the time of issuance.
Nguyen v. State, 14 P.3d 515, 518-19 (Nev. 2000). This is incorrect as a matter of law,
unless Mr. Nguyen’s lawyers negligently failed to offer evidence that meets the test of
course of performance, course of dealing and/or trade usage.
68 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 214. “Whether a writing has been adopted as
an integrated agreement and, if so, whether the agreement is completely or partially inte-
grated are questions determined by the court preliminary to determination of a question of
interpretation or to application of the parol evidence rule. . . . Writings do not prove them-
selves . . . .” Id., § 214 cmt. a.
69 Id. §§ 215, 216(1).
70 Id. § 216(2)(b).
71 Adding the parol evidence rule to the mix increases the complexity of the analysis signifi-
cantly, especially with respect to court holdings that evidence a lack of understanding of
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If it is claimed that a consistent additional term was omitted from an integrated agree-
ment and the omission seems natural in the circumstances, it is not necessary to
consider further the questions whether the agreement is completely integrated and
whether the omitted term is within its scope, although factual questions may remain.
This situation is especially likely to arise when the writing is in a standardized form
which does not lend itself to the insertion of additional terms. Thus agreements col-
lateral to a negotiable instrument if written on the instrument might destroy its nego-
tiability or otherwise make it less acceptable to third parties; the instrument may not
have space for the additional term.72
This language could have been written with casino markers in mind.
As the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently concluded, “a
casino marker and a credit application agreement may be, but need not be, part
of the same transaction,” such that the parties intended them to be read together
to define their agreement.73 Consequently, the court remanded the case for a
factual finding in response to the casino’s effort to enforce the marker standing
alone.74 In short, to suggest that a written casino marker stands as an indepen-
dent and exclusive memorial of the agreement of the parties regarding the pro-
vision of credit flies in the face of nearly universal practices and is inconsistent
with the equally frequently expressed intentions of the parties. In the absence of
additional–and, certainly, unusual facts–a court should not conclude that a
casino marker was intended by the parties to be a complete integration of the
agreement of the parties that supersedes their prior agreements and
understandings.
However, a marker is likely to be regarded as a “partial integration” of the
parties’ agreement, inasmuch as the parties intend the writing to be a final state-
ment of the terms that are included in the writing. Under the parol evidence
rule, extrinsic evidence of terms of the agreement between the parties is admis-
sible as long as the evidence does not contradict a term of the writing.75 On one
these issues. In TeleRecovery of La., Inc. v. Gaulon, 98-1363 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/1/99); 738
So. 2d 662, discussed in note 49, the court would have properly precluded submission of
evidence of a side agreement if it had found explicitly that the plaintiff was a holder in due
course. However, the court conflates the fact that the marker is a negotiable instrument with
the conclusion that it is a check subject to the bad check law, and does not address the trial
court’s misapplication of the parol evidence rule to bar evidence of the contingency to pay-
ment caused by the credit agreement. The court reaches the correct result, but it does so only
by engaging in a horribly mangled analysis that assumes more than it establishes.
72 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 216, cmt. d.
73 Las Vegas Sands, LLC v. Nehme, 632 F.3d 526, 537 (9th Cir. 2011).
74 Id.
75 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 216. The Nevada Supreme Court expressly
adopted the parol evidence rule principles of the First Restatement, Daly v. Del E. Webb
Corp., 609 P.2d 319 (1980), and so there is a basis to believe that the Court would adopt the
principles of the Second Restatement. The sparse case law in Nevada tracks the modern
application of the parol evidence rule as articulated in the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts. It is well established that “the existence of a separate oral agreement as to any matter
on which a written contract is silent, and which is not inconsistent with its terms, may be
proven by parol. Alexander v. Simmons, 518 P.2d 160, 161 (Nev. 1974).” Crow-Spieker #23
v. Robinson, 629 P.2d 1198, 1199 (Nev. 1981). The determination of the integration of the
writing is premised on the intent of the parties in the circumstances.
The case law is clear that the mere existence of a written contract is insufficient to prevent a
party from showing a separate and independent contemporaneous oral agreement. Douglass v.
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hand, the markers are form documents that are silent as to the date they become
payable, and therefore there is no disposition date in the writing to conflict with
the offered evidence. On the other hand, in the absence of a date, the UCC
presumes that an instrument is “payable on demand.”76 These principles of law
are easily reconciled. Courts should find that the express agreement to hold the
marker for sixty days, in light of the usage of trade, course of dealing, and
course of performance, does not contradict an agreed term in a marker that
includes no date or time of repayment, and so evidence of the agreement
regarding the disposition date would not be precluded by the parol evidence
rule.77
Thompson, 127 P. 561 (1912). Undoubtedly the existence of a separate oral agreement as to any
matter on which a written contract is silent, and which is not inconsistent with its terms, may be
proven by parol, if under the circumstances of the particular case it may properly be inferred that
the parties did not intend the written paper to be a complete and final statement of the whole of
the transaction between them. Seitz v. Brewers’ Refrigerating Machine Co., 141 U.S. 510, 517
(1891).
Alexander, 518 P.2d at 161. Recent cases embody the basic principle that a formal and
detailed written term may not be altered by introduction of parol, Kaldi v. Farmers Ins.
Exch., 21 P.2d 16, 22 (Nev. 2001), but parol evidence should be admitted and considered
when the proffered term might reasonably be read together with the written term, Lowden
Inv. Co. v. General Elec. Credit Co., 741 P.2d 806, 809 (Nev. 1987).
76 See, e.g., Fleeger v. Bell, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1131 (D. Nev. 2000) (“The markers do not
delineate any explicit dates for repayment, thereby subjecting the payor to a repayment obli-
gation at the will of the payee. Thus, this court finds the disputed casino markers to be
negotiable ‘checks’ . . . .”). As argued in this article, this presumption of payable on demand
is properly overcome by evidence that the agreement of the parties (whether reflected on the
face of the marker or not) is otherwise.
77 An illustration in the Restatement appears to suggest the contrary conclusion, but a care-
ful interpretation of the illustration in context reveals that the Restatement is in accord with
my analysis. Illustration 1 provides: “A check states no date of payment, but it is orally
agreed that the check will be paid only after six months. The oral agreement contradicts the
check.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 216, illus. 1. However, this conclusion is
justified as follows: “Under Uniform Commercial Code § 3-108 the check is payable on
demand, and most competent adults in the United States have reason to know the rule.” Id.
We can easily question the factual premise of this explanation, but it is clear that the expla-
nation assumes that the contextual understanding of the parties in tendering a personal check
is that it is payable immediately unless post-dated. In other words, the oral agreement to hold
the check is contradicted by the failure to do what is necessary and expected in order to
express that agreement: post-date the instrument. This illustration is offered under the com-
ment that explains the standard of “inconsistency” with the writing. This reading is rein-
forced by illustrations that clear gap-filling terms do not render prior oral agreements
contradictory of writings that are silent on the term in question. One illustration of the “natu-
rally omitted” test provides:
A and B sign a standard form of written agreement for the sale of goods, complete on its face
except that a blank for time and place of delivery is not filled in. It is claimed that the writing
was signed on the oral understanding that delivery would be made within 30 days at the buyer’s
place of business. Under Uniform Commercial Code §§ 2-308 and 2-309, the goods would be
deliverable, unless otherwise agreed, within a reasonable time at the seller’s place of business.
The written agreement is not completely integrated, and the oral understanding is admissible in
evidence to supplement its terms.
Id. § 216, illus. 6; see also id. § 216, illus. 7 (default rule for shipment terms is not inconsis-
tent with prior oral agreement). Unlike a situation involving a personal check, the parties
have no reason to know the gap-filling rules, and so their omission of some of the terms of
their agreement from the writing is not inconsistent with the silence of the written agree-
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For example, a “high roller,” such as Mr. Watanabe, will negotiate a spe-
cific agreement with the casino regarding a variety of benefits, including an
extended disposition date for all markers. Express agreement of the disposition
date might be regarded as a “prior agreement” reached before the execution of
the marker, and thus the parol evidence rule would apply. Even in this situation,
the evidence of the agreement on a disposition date should be regarded as evi-
dence that is consistent with the written marker that is only a partial integration
of the agreement of the parties. Mr. Watanabe should have been free to prove
that the markers were not properly payable until sixty days from the date of
execution without this being viewed as contradicting a written term in the
markers.78
If casinos desire to use the state police power to collect their debts, they
may easily do so by accepting personal checks from customers and depositing
them immediately. Casinos do not perform preliminary credit checks and then
accept personal checks to the exclusion of markers precisely because they wish
to facilitate increased gambling by their customers. In other words, the credit
nature of the markers is essential to how they operate: high-end gamblers
would not agree to “pay as they go,” and casinos would make much less money
if there were no credit extended. Although it might appear that paying by check
rather than by cash is a form of credit transaction because it is still necessary
for the casino to present the check for collection, the UCC makes clear that
payment by check immediately suspends the debt (which may be treated as
paid) subject to the condition of collection.79 For example, a seller that is paid
by a check that is later returned NSF is entitled to reclaim the goods from the
buyer as a “cash seller” under UCC § 2-507(2).80 Markers are different from
personal checks because they are designed and marketed to gamblers to serve
as a form of credit, which allows the gambler to “win back” losses before hav-
ing to pay or to adjust his or her finances before payment comes due. This well-
known fact would probably be sufficient to establish a clear usage of trade in
the industry. The usage of trade might not be specific enough to permit a party
to claim that it is entitled to a “hold” for a certain number of days, but it should
be sufficient to establish that a “hold” of some kind is in the nature of the
instrument, and this is sufficient to establish that markers are not checks.81
ment. Casino markers present an even stronger case for concluding that the disposition date
was naturally omitted from the marker. Given the nearly universal practice of “holding” the
markers for a specified time, and in issuing markers only in the context of an overriding
credit agreement previously agreed by the parties, it is quite natural that the parties would
not include the fact of the disposition date on each marker. Silence in the marker is not
inconsistent with the agreement of the parties, as manifested by the prior credit agreement,
course of performance, course of dealing and usage of trade.
78 In the event that a court would decide on peculiar facts that the agreed disposition date
conflicted with the written marker, it might still be possible to utilize the doctrine of promis-
sory estoppel to avoid application of the parol evidence rule. See generally, Michael B.
Metzger, The Parol Evidence Rule: Promissory Estoppel’s Next Conquest?, 36 VAND. L.
REV. 1383 (1983).
79 U.C.C. § 2-511(3) (1994); NEV. REV. STAT. § 104.2511(3) (2009).
80 U.C.C. § 2-507(2) (2004); NEV. REV. STAT. § 104.2507(2) (2009).
81 In MGM Desert Inn, Inc. v. Shack, 609 F. Supp. 783, 786 (D. Nev. 1993) the court
acknowledged that personal checks are negotiable instruments subject to ordinary contract
defenses, but then concluded that because the side agreement providing that the checks were
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3. Parties May Not Consent to Application of a Criminal Statute
Beyond Its Scope
In the Watanabe matter, the marker included language to the effect that
the marker was a credit instrument that was equivalent to a check, and there-
fore, subject to the bad check statute and criminal process.82 This self-serving
legend should have no effect on the legal analysis of whether the marker is
within the bad check criminal statute. First, the marker makes this declaration
as a statement in quotation marks and does not purport to be describing an
agreement of the parties. Second, even if Mr. Watanabe “agreed” to this state-
ment, the parties may not change the meaning of the statutes comprising the
law of negotiable instruments. The marker is either a check that falls within the
scope of the criminal statute, or it is not. Agreement has no role to play in the
determination of the scope of criminal statutes.
C. A Casino is Subject to Defenses to the Enforcement of Markers, and
Criminal Liability Should Not Attach When a Customer Refuses To Pay
Because of the Offsetting Defenses
Even if a marker is a negotiable instrument that has been executed in
exchange for the value given in the form of casino chips, the marker remains
subject to any and all contract defenses that the customer might raise regarding
the credit arrangement with the casino. In the civil complaint filed by Mr.
Watanabe, he asserts he refused payment on the final $14.75 million in markers
because Harrah’s had breached its agreement with him regarding his benefits as
a high roller and had taken advantage of him in breach of their agreement and
in violation of gaming regulations. Because Harrah’s is not a holder in due
course, it is subject to these contract defenses. Although the civil action filed
against Harrah’s was framed as tort allegations, many of these allegations
(fraud, undue influence, misrepresentation, duress, etc.) would potentially serve
as contract defenses to the credit arrangement that led to the creation of the
not payable on demand was an oral agreement concluded more than one year earlier it failed
to satisfy the one-year provision of the statute of frauds. This is a poor application of the
statute of frauds provision, and is not an argument that should be relevant in most cases
involving marker agreements. The one-year provision is generally applied by modern courts
to include contracts within the statute of frauds only if they could not be completed within
one year of the making of the contract. See, e.g., Freedman v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 372
N.E.2d 12 (N.Y. 1977) (oral agreement made nine years earlier is not within the statute
because the contract could have possibly been performed within one year). The modern rule
is followed in Nevada. Compare Stone v. Mission Bay Mortg. Co., 672 P.2d 629, 630 (Nev.
1983) (employment contract for “not less than one year” is not within the statute because it
could have been terminated during the probationary period) with Edwards Ind., Inc. v. DTE/
BTE, Inc., 923 P.2d 569, 573 (Nev. 1996) (multi-year equipment lease cannot be completed
within a year and so falls within the statute). It seems implausible that a party would ever
assert that a credit arrangement regarding the disposition date of markers was for a term of
years that could not possibly be completed within one year.
82 The Harrah’s casino markers signed by Watanabe include the following statement in quo-
tation marks:
A credit instrument is identical to a personal check. Willfully drawing or passing a credit instru-
ment knowing there are insufficient funds in the account upon which it may be drawn, or with
the intent to defraud, is a crime in the State of Nevada, which may result in criminal prosecution.
Copies of the markers upon which the indictment was brought are on file with the author.
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markers. If Harrah’s defaulted on its contractual arrangements with Mr.
Watanabe, these allegations might be a basis for precluding enforcement of the
markers or providing a substantial offset. If the markers were determined to be
unenforceable or subject to offset, or at least plausibly so, it is difficult to
understand how failing to pay the markers as a response to the dispute could
constitute a crime. The presumption of intent to defraud that arises when the
marker is dishonored is overcome if it is established that the item was not
enforceable or was subject to offset.
III. CONCLUSION
Casino markers are not checks within the meaning of the criminal provi-
sions of the bad check statute if the parties have agreed that the markers are not
payable immediately. Agreement may be express, as in the case with high roll-
ers such as Mr. Watanabe, but the agreement may also exist by virtue of course
of performance, course of dealing, and industry usage. Markers have special
relevance within the modern casino industry precisely because they are not per-
sonal checks that are payable on demand, and so it is unlikely that a casino
marker should ever trigger criminal liability under the bad check statute.
This does not leave casinos without recourse against those who wrongfully
refuse to pay their debts. A casino marker is still an enforceable credit instru-
ment, and casinos have recourse to civil process to collect on the loan no less
than any other business that extends unsecured credit. Casinos wishing to
secure the collection services of the District Attorney backed by the threat of
criminal prosecution may do so by entering into agreements with customers
that permits the customer to write a personal check that is payable on demand
in exchange for gaming chips.
The warping effect of incorrectly regarding casino markers as checks is
apparent in the Watanabe incident. If Harrah’s had to collect its unpaid loan
like any other commercial enterprise in the state, it would have had to address
the very serious accusations made by Mr. Watanabe, and the Nevada Gaming
Control Board would not have felt compelled to hold off on taking action pend-
ing resolution of the criminal charges against Mr. Watanabe. The threat of as
many as twenty-eight years in prison is a powerful motivator; few borrowers
will risk prison time no matter how good their defenses may be. With this 800-
pound gorilla of a criminal indictment in the room, the ordinary process of civil
litigation and regulatory oversight cannot ensure that casinos are abiding by
their obligations.
This Article does not address the profound due process concerns raised by
the District Attorney having a significant financial interest in successful prose-
cutions under the bad check statute.83 These concerns were concretized in the
83 Mr. Watanabe raised these issues in his Motion to Dismiss Indictment. Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss Indictment and to Disqualify the Clark County District Attorney’s Office
(Motion No. 2) State v. Watanabe, No. C254057 (Nev. Clark Cnty. Dist. Ct. Jun. 11, 2010)
(copy on file with author). The legal issues are sketched effectively in an unpublished stu-
dent note, Dustun Holmes, Whaling in the Nevada Desert: Does NRS § 204.471 Violate the
Constitutional Rights of a Defendant? (Mar. 27, 2011) (unpublished note) (on file with the
UNLV Gaming Law Journal).
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Watanabe-Harrah’s matter when Mr. Watanabe and Harrah’s reached an agree-
ment about their contract dispute, but the District Attorney required payment of
a $500,000 “fee” before dismissing the criminal charges.84 Even more dra-
matic, a bankruptcy court issued a stay of a criminal prosecution under the bad
check statute after finding that the prosecution was primarily a debt collection
action.85 Regardless of the strong public policy reasons against this kind of
collection arrangement, it is clear that the bad check statute does not apply
properly to casino markers. The Supreme Court of Nevada should reverse its
error.
84 In the cover letter accompanying the payment to the District Attorney, Mr. Watanabe’s
legal counsel characterized the payment as a “payment of a fee to the Bad Check Unit for its
various programs.” Letter from Daniel J. Albregts to David J. Roger, Clark County District
Attorney (July 7, 2010) (on file with author). The letter was counter-signed by the District
Attorney. Under the Nev. Rules of Prof’l Conduct 1.5(a) (2006), “A lawyer shall not . . .
collect an unreasonable fee.”  The public prosecutor was not charging a fee of a client in this
case, but the facts suggest that it is at least plausible that the prosecutor collected an unrea-
sonable fee based on the facts known and the work performed by the attorneys in the Bad
Check Unit. This is a strange way to view the relationship, but that strangeness is one of the
effects of the Bad Check Unit having a financial interest in cases that it prosecutes.
85 In re Simonini, 282 B.R. 604 (W.D.N.C. 2002), vacated by 69 Fed. Appx. 169 (4th Cir.
2003). Although noting that the federal government intended to exempt all criminal prosecu-
tions for the automatic stay provision of bankruptcy law, the court concluded that the core of
the Nevada system is debt collection. “To put it bluntly, the statute appears to be aptly
paraphrased as stating: ‘No matter what you do, get this defendant to make full restitu-
tion.’ . . . . It emphasizes collection no matter what, and correspondingly impacts the target
individual like a debtor, unprotected by the automatic stay.” Id. at 620. Although the Court
of Appeals vacated the injunction in an unpublished opinion, it did not take issue with the
Bankruptcy Court’s characterization of the criminal prosecution as being a debt collection
action. Rather, the Court of Appeals simply held that the federal policy not to enjoin state
criminal prosecutions was absolute in this context. In re Simonini, 69 Fed Appx. at 171.
